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Christine Tappolet [9] posed a problem for alethic pluralism: either deny
the truth of conjunctions whose conjuncts are from distinct domains of inquiry,
or posit a generic global truth property thus making other truth properties re-
dundant. Douglas Edwards [2] has attempted to solve the problem by avoiding
the horns of Tappolet’s dilemma. After first noting an unappreciated conse-
quence of Edwards’ view regarding a proliferation of truth properties, I show
that Edwards’ proposal fails to avoid Tappolet’s original dilemma. His response
is not successful as it lets in a generic truth property through the ‘back door’.
I conclude by briefly offering a new solution to the problem, and an alternative
diagnosis of Tappolet’s dilemma.
1. Tappolet’s Dilemma
The alethic pluralist contends that propositions from different domains can be
true in different ways.1 Mixed conjunctions have conjuncts from different do-
mains; consider for example, ‘1 + 1 = 2 and murder is wrong’. A pressing
question for the pluralist: if each conjunct is true in a distinct way, in what way
is the conjunction true? Tappolet argues,
[M]ixed conjunctions need to be true in a further way. [. . . ] But
then each conjunct has to be true in the same way. This is what
follows from the truism that a conjunction is true if and only if its
conjuncts are true. Hence the question arises again why this further
way of being true is not the only one we need. ([9], 385)
Edwards puts Tappolet’s contention as a dilemma: either admit a generic truth
property that can apply to all propositions, regardless of domain, or deny that
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mixed conjunctions can be true. It is prima facie plausible that mixed conjunc-
tions can be true. Moreover, admitting a generic truth property would seemingly
undermine alethic pluralism by making other truth properties redundant.
2. Edwards’ Solution
Edwards’ solution attempts to avoid both horns of the dilemma. He questions
Tappolet’s assumption that each conjunct must be true in the same way as the
mixed conjunction itself.
The correspondence theory of truth endorses (1) and (2), identifying truth
with the property of ‘corresponding to a fact ’.
(1) p is true (corresponds to a fact).
(2) q is true (corresponds to a fact).
But must the correspondence theorist also admit (3)?
(3) p& q is true (corresponds to a fact).
Edwards rightly notes that if the correspondence theorist does not admit con-
junctive facts into her ontology, she is left in Tappolet’s dilemma: either deny
that conjunctions can be true or admit a non-correspondence notion of truth
that applies to conjuncts as well as conjunctions. So, Tappolet’s objection is a
problem for pluralists only if it is a problem for other monistic theories of truth.
Edwards suggests that rather than accept the dilemma, the correspondence
theorist can endorse (4).
(4) p& q is true by virtue of p corresponding to a fact and q corresponding to
fact.
While the way in which p& q is true is derivative and entirely dependent on
the truth of its conjuncts, the reverse direction of dependency does not hold.
Edwards thinks a similar reply is available to the alethic pluralist. The pluralist
can explain the truth of mixed conjunctions by (5).
(5) p& q is true by virtue of p being true and q being true.
Edwards admits that the conjunction must be true in some way distinct from
the ways the conjuncts are true, but he denies that this third truth property
needs to be had by each conjunct. Here lies a mistaken assumption in Tappolet’s
dilemma.
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3. Generic Truth
One is now left with a further question: just what is this distinct third way in
which the conjunction is true? Since conjunctions must be true in some differ-
ent way from atomics, one would like to know a bit more about the property.
Edwards offers little explanation.
The further way that the conjunction is true is such that the truth
of the conjunction is dependent on the truth of the individual con-
juncts. ([2], 148)
In light of Edwards’ solution for the correspondence theorist, it appears he must
be thinking along the following lines.
(6) p is true (is true1)
(7) q is true (is true2)
(8) So, p& q is true by virtue of p being true1 and q being true2.
So the relevant truth property of this conjunction seems to be ‘having a conjunct
that is true1 and a conjunct that is true2’. But this property can only be had
by conjunctions with conjuncts from domain 1 and domain 2. Clearly, we need
some more general specification of the truth property had by all true mixed
conjunctions if they are true in some distinct way.
An adequate property for true conjunctions would have to be something like
truec: for any atomics p and q:
(9) p& q is truec iff p is in domain 1 and p is true1,
or p is in domain 2 and p is true2,
. . . or p is in domain n and p is truen;
and q is in domain 1 and q is true1,
or q is in domain 2 and q is true2,
. . . or q is in domain n and q is truen.
As desired, truec is such that the truth of a conjunction is dependent on the
truth of its conjuncts, without requiring that each conjunct itself have truec.
However, there are two consequences of conjunctions having a property like
truec that are worth highlighting. The first is that it leads to a proliferation of
truth properties; the second is that it does not avoid a generic truth property.
4 Generic truth and mixed conjunctions: some alternatives6
The first consequence is that Edwards’ solution, and hence truec, is tailor-
made for conjunctions. If truec is the truth property for conjunctions, what
of other logical compounds like disjunctions, conditionals, etc.? If Edwards
wishes to treat other truth-functional compounds in a parallel way, he will have
an unappealing result: every distinct logical form will require a distinct truth
property had by sentences of that form. Moreover, there are complications
for iterated conjunctions. Consider a conjunction like p& (q& r). What truth
property will it have? Clearly, it cannot have truec, since the definition of truec
fails to include itself among the truth properties.3 Must there be a new truth
property for iterated conjunctions? Yes. Edwards admits in a footnote,
[W]hen one of the conjuncts is a conjunction, what makes that con-
junct true (having each of its conjuncts being true) will be different
from what makes a conjunct consisting of a singular proposition true
(having the relevant truth property for its domain of discourse). ([2],
147 f. 8)
Strictly speaking, only ‘level 1’ conjunctions (of atomics) will have truec. ‘Level
2’ conjunctions must have some other distinct truth property, ‘level 3’ conjunc-
tions some further property, and so on. The result is a proliferation of truth
properties. One might think that such a proliferation, however prima facie ex-
treme, is part and parcel of truth pluralism, and that the given proliferation is
thereby not a problem for Edwards’ proposal.5 Without trying to decide the
issue here, I shall only note two points about the first consequence of Edwards’
proposal.
First, truth pluralists tend to think that the pluralism of truth arises from
recognizably different metaphysical properties; none of them have suggested the
infinite pluralism of truth ‘properties’ required by Edwards’ solution. So, at
the very least, Edwards’ proposal increases the pluralism in truth pluralism in
a surprising way and a simpler pluralism might be preferred. In §4, I offer one
such pluralist solution that avoids proliferation of this kind. The second, related,
point is simply that the proposal is against a ‘sparse’ conception of properties.
Whether, in the end, the first consequence is a problem or merely a surprise
in Edwards’ proposed solution is something I leave open. What is clearer is
that the second consequence, to which I now turn, is a genuine problem with
Edwards’ proposal: his solution fails to get around Tappolet’s dilemma. Truec
3Hence, the relativization to atomic p and q.
5Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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is itself a ‘conjunctive property’; it has, intuitively speaking, two parts. The
first part of the property – call it truep – is as follows.
(10) p is truep iff p is in domain 1 and p is true1,
or p is in domain 2 and p is true2,
. . . or p is in domain n and p is truen.
Now, if the pluralist claims that truec is the truth property for conjunctions,
she will likewise hold that truep is a property of p.7 But notice that truep will be
true of p regardless of its domain. That is, truep is precisely the sort of generic
truth property that constitutes the first horn of Tappolet’s dilemma.8 If the
pluralist admits that truec is a genuine truth property for mixed conjunctions,
she has let a generic truth property in ‘through the back door’. And as far as
I can see, any way of defining a truth property for mixed conjunctions along
Edwards’ lines will result in a generic truth property for all sentences.
4. A New Solution and An Alternative Diagnosis
There are very few solutions to Tappolet’s dilemma proposed in the literature.9
In what follows, I provide a new solution to the problem that does not, as far
as I can see, require a generic property of truth. And since it does not require
the truth of conjunctions to be true in some distinct way, the new solution does
not result in a proliferation of truth properties.
The solution trades on the fact that there are natural solutions to analogous
problems with negations and mixed disjunctions. Mixed negations of atomics
do not exist, and so a negation is true in the same way that its negand is false (or
false in the same way the negand is true). That is, we allow ∼p to have the truth
property for the domain of p. For negations of compounds, the same solution
is available: a negated compound is true in the same way(s) the compound is
7Moreover, if the considerations above are correct regarding Edwards’ proliferation of truth
properties, the pluralist will not be able to appeal to a sparse conception of properties in order
to deny the existence of a property like truep.
8Nikolaj Pedersen [6] has argued that alethic pluralists can avoid having a generic disjunc-
tive property of truth only if they hold a sparse conception of properties. Clearly, in this case
admitting truec as a genuine property will require a less-than-sparse conception of properties.
Indeed, all the same motivations for considering truec a property will be motivation for taking
truep to be a genuine property.
9Most of the literature is aimed at a related, yet different, problem of mixed inferences
which is due to Tappolet [8]. See Beall [1], Lynch [3], and Pedersen [6]. The only published
discussions of the mixed conjunction problem appear to be Williamson [10], Tappolet [9],
Edwards [2] and Lynch [4]. Lynch’s forthcoming book [5] also provides an extensive treatment.
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false (or false in the same way(s) the compound is true). The more difficult
cases concern compounds. We might naturally suggest that a disjunction p ∨ q
is true in the same way its true disjunct is. Supposing p is in domain m and
q in domain n, let the disjunction be truem if p is truem, and let it be truen if
q is truen. If both disjuncts are true, let the disjunction be true in both ways.
Likewise, if a disjunction is false, it is false in both ways the disjuncts are false.
These seem to be natural responses for negations and disjunctions. But
De Morgan principles for propositional logic tell us that p& q is equivalent to
∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q). It is available to the pluralist simply to treat conjunction as a
defined connective, and to suggest that mixed conjunctions are true in a parallel
way to mixed disjunctions. So, p& q is true in the way that ∼p ∨ ∼ q is false
(by the truth conditions for negation). But ∼p ∨ ∼q must be false in the way
that ∼ p is false and the way that ∼ q is false (by the falsity conditions for
disjunction). We have it that ∼ p is false in the same way that p is true, and
∼q is false in the same way that q is true (by the falsity conditions for negation).
Therefore, p& q will have the truth property for p and the truth property for q,
but need not be true in some further way.
This solution seems promising as it does not generate a generic truth prop-
erty, it requires no distinct truth property for compounds, and it treats all
truth-functional connectives in a unified way.11 If, as Edwards appears to think,
pluralists are required to do without a generic property of truth, there may be
reason to explore this solution further.
I should note, however, that I do not endorse the above solution. This is
because I see no reason to think that pluralists must avoid Tappolet’s dilemma.
In particular, while some pluralists reject the existence of a single generic truth
property12, I suggest that Tappolet is wrong to argue that a single generic
property of truth would make other truth properties redundant.
Consider, for example, truep above. An acceptance of truep as a generic
notion of truth would not make true1, . . . , truen redundant or unnecessary.
Since truep is defined as a disjunction of true1, . . . , truen, its existence depends
on these truth properties. On the contrary, it would seem that the existence of
true1, . . . , truen would make truep redundant, were it not for the problem of
mixed conjunctions. In general, I suggest a pluralist can accept a generic truth
property only if the generic property is defined by (or ‘essentially’ dependent
11Non-truth-functional compounds may well present further problems for pluralists, but
discussion of this would be beyond the scope of this paper.
12For the most prominent example, see Wright’s [11] denial of a generic truth property.
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on) the other truth properties.
Does accepting a generic truth property undermine the motivations for
alethic pluralism? Pluralists often cite the varied and radical differences between
propositions as their main motivation for positing multiple truth properties.14
But defining a generic property of truth by disjoining the many domain-relative
truth properties hardly undermines this motivation. The disjunctive property is
generic only because the domain-relative properties have already captured the
differences between the domains. The charge is akin to claiming that there is no
difference between apples and numbers since one can always define a property
of being either an apple or a number.
Contrary to Edwards, his solution to the problem of mixed conjunctions
does not avoid a generic truth property. What pluralists should learn from this,
however, is that a generic truth property need not be avoided.15
References
[1] JC Beall. On mixed inferences and pluralism about truth predicates. The
Philosophical Quarterly, 50:380–382, 2000.
[2] D. Edwards. How to solve the problem of mixed conjunctions. Analysis,
68.2:143–149, April 2008.
[3] M.P. Lynch. A functionalist theory of truth. In M.P. Lynch, editor, The
Nature of Truth, pages 723–750. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001.
[4] M.P. Lynch. Truth and multiple realizability. Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 82(3):384–408, 2004.
[5] M.P. Lynch. Truth as One and Many: A Pluralist Manifesto. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, forthcoming.
[6] N.J. Pedersen. What can the problem of mixed inferences teach us about
pluralism? The Monist, 89(1):102–117, 2006.
[7] G. Sher. In search of a substantive theory of truth. The Journal of Philos-
ophy, 101:5–36, 2004.
14See Lynch’s scope problem [4, 5], or Sher’s disunity challenge [7].
15Thanks to JC Beall, Colin Caret, Douglas Edwards, Michael Lynch, Nikolaj Pedersen,
and Lionel Shapiro for valuable comments and discussion.
8 Generic truth and mixed conjunctions: some alternatives17
[8] C. Tappolet. Mixed inferences: A problem for pluralism about truth pred-
icates. Analysis, 57:209–210, 1997.
[9] C. Tappolet. Truth pluralism and many-valued logics: A reply to Beall.
The Philosophical Quarterly, 50:382–385, 2000.
[10] T. Williamson. A critical study of truth and objectivity. International
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 30:130–144, 1994.
[11] C. Wright. Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1992.
